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Abstract 
The financial crisis can be understood in many different terms.  In this 
paper it is analysed in terms of the unfolding of a series of elite 
narratives, that shaped the agenda of regulation before the crisis, that 
were damaged by the crisis, and that were then reframed and recounted 
again in the wake of the crisis.  The form of these stories differs in subtle 
ways by jurisdiction, and thus the fate of post crisis regulatory practice 
likewise differs. 
 
Introduction: the crisis and governance agendas for finance  
 
The aim of this special issue, as defined by the editors in their initial 
guidance to contributors, is ‘to examine the contours of the postcrisis 
governing agenda.’  This chapter addresses the heart of the matter, for it 
focuses directly on the  cause  of the crisis: the great crash in financial 
markets.  In the economic catastrophe of 2008-9, financial markets were 
the epicentre.  The magnitude of the financial crisis alone is dizzying: all 
large capitalist democracies (and many small ones) were faced with the 
greatest threat to the stability of their banking systems since at least the 
end of the 1920s – and perhaps for more than a century.  In the UK the 
crisis prompted ‘the largest UK government intervention in financial 
markets since the outbreak of the First World War’ (Bank of England 
2008: 31.) Every big capitalist democracy was forced to take a large 
chunk of its financial system into public ownership; to use the power and 
authority of the state to compel reorganisation of the banking system; and 
to use the state’s authority and fiscal resources to try to  shore up 
confidence in banking markets. But the significance of the banking crisis 
of course goes well beyond the domain of banking alone.  The wider 
human and economic costs of the regulatory catastrophe are almost 
incalculable because they extend so widely: in brief, the financial system   
pushed the world economy to a great recession.   The fiscal consequences 
of the crisis are compelling drastic cuts in public services and increases in 
taxation; and, before the cuts could be implemented, the fiscal crisis of 
individuals states turned into a sovereign debt crisis for the euro zone 
which required a trillion euro bail out and volte face by the European 
Central Bank.   By the end of 2010 crises for the weaker national 
Eurozone economies like Ireland and Portugal were threatening to turn 
into an existential crisis for the whole eurozone system.  
 
 3 
In examining the contours of the post-crisis governing agenda in financial 
markets we cannot just concentrate on the present, still less speculate 
about the future.  Understanding where we are now, and possible future 
alternatives, demands understanding both how we got to the point of 
regulatory meltdown, how that meltdown was managed, and how the 
most important interests involved in the crisis have regrouped, as they try 
to influence how   markets are to be governed in the future.  There 
already exist many accounts of the broad structural conditions which 
shaped the crisis (for instance Haldane 2009;  Bean 2009.)  Since our 
primary concern is with market governance, the paper focuses on the 
politics of the crisis and the post crisis world, broadly construed: that is, 
we try to analyse the confluence of stories, interests and ideologies that 
shaped the way financial market governance was done before the crisis 
and then shaped an (ongoing)  struggle over banking reform and financial  
market governance after the crisis.   
 
The shape of the paper is conditioned by a few simple insights: that it was 
a crisis in the government of markets; that the management of the crisis 
had to attend to that government; that the struggles in the post-crisis 
world are about how to reconstruct government; and that, to recall the 
task given us by the editors, ‘the developing shape of the post-crisis 
agenda’ will be a function of how stories, interests, ideologies now  
interact in new and different ways in a protracted, unresolved  struggle 
about regulation, involving regulatory agencies, democratic politicians 
and market interests. In framing the difference between governance 
before and after the crisis, we take the concept of agenda very seriously. 
The standard bureacratic usage of agenda as the “list of things to be 
done” dates from the late nineteenth century.  There is a more morally 
prescriptive meaning which can be found in Bentham and in Keynes, 
which refers to the things that government urgently should do, but that is 
not a wide usage (on  Keynes, and Keynes’ debt to Bentham see Keynes 
1926/2004.)  An earlier liturgical usage of the term has a particular 
relevance to the themes of this paper: agenda is used to denote matters of 
ritual or a prescribed set of forms for public worship (as in the Latin 
Mass); this was carried over from Catholic into Lutheran usage with the 
German concept of Agende or Kirchagende (Schaff Herzog, 1951). There 
is also a later political usage as “a campaign, programme, or plan of 
action arising from  underlying principles, motivations etc”; this usage is 
surprisingly recent and was included in the OED for the first time in the 
December 2007 additions which give 1976 as date of first usage. Our 
argument about governance before and after the crisis plays between 
these two non standard usages of the term and focuses on the changing 
role and balance of stories and interests. Immediately before the crisis, 
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the governing agenda was narrowed by shared stories about the Great 
Moderation and the benefits of financial innovation; these reassuring 
liturgies operated in a frame of ideologies and interests that had for 
several decades increasingly undermined political questioning of, or 
resistance to, finance After the crisis, the old familiar liturgies are  
replaced by competing stories from bankers, politicians and regulators so 
that multiple political agendas conflict in a new conjuncture where the 
clash of interests, institutions and ideologies becomes much more 
important. 
 
The paper is thus mainly constructed out of the three numbered blocks 
that follow.  It culminates (section 3) in an account of the post crisis 
agenda, following the guidance given us by the issue editors.  But that 
post crisis world simply cannot be understood without the two preceding 
sections: the section that follows analyses the source of the great crisis; 
and section 2 analyses the process of crisis management in and after 
2007-8.    
 
 
(1) Regulatory Origins of the Crisis:  framing conditions and   
liturgies of the 2000s   
 
This section has three aims which are dealt with in turn as the argument 
develops.  First,  we  set up the problem: our  explicandum is massive 
regulatory failure across several different national jurisdictions with 
historically different  traditions practices of regulation. Second, we  
provide part of an explanation for regulatory failure without invoking 
concepts like Anglo American capitalism or neo liberalism: our analysis 
explains how multiple conditions of interests, institutions and ideologies 
in the UK and USA after the 1980s combined to undermine resistance to 
finance. Third, we  go beyond the methodological nationalism which is 
implicit in much discussion of interests and institutions: our emphasis 
here is on the liturgies about the Great Moderation and the benefits of 
financial innovation. In the conjuncture between 2000 and 2007, these 
stories were shared by regulators, academics, bankers, media and the 
politicians and served as the keystone in the arch of  complacency.  
 
The magnitude of the crisis is generating an explanatory literature of 
comparable magnitude, and this literature draws inspiration from many 
points of the theoretical and ideological spectra.  But whether the crisis is 
viewed as a vindication of theories of efficient markets (Minford 2010) or 
as a further episode in the prolonged structural crisis of the capitalist 
order (Burnham 2010) there can surely be one point of agreement:  it was 
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at root a massive failure of regulatory practice.  It could be argued that 
the failure of a single institution, like Northern Rock in the UK, was 
compatible with a robustly functioning regulatory system, for after all it is 
hardly reasonable to expect regulatory institutions to abolish all risk of 
enterprise failure.  But the prevention of precisely such a systemic 
meltdown as almost happened in October 2008, and the hugely damaging 
consequences for the wider economy which followed, is exactly what we 
should expect of a regulatory regime.  And indeed, while Northern Rock 
was a single failure, that case  exhibited wider features of the dominant 
UK regulatory style – complacency, incompetence, and  subjection to 
market actors (House of Commons Treasury Committee 2008; Financial 
Services Authority 2008). 
 
Making sense of this comprehensive regulatory failure is plainly difficult, 
for what we are looking at here is a multi national and international 
problem about the failure of many different regulatory regimes, 
configured in many different institutional ways, in many different 
political environments, and exhibiting many different regulatory cultures.  
It is hard to correlate the incidence of crisis with particular institutional 
arrangements, or regulatory styles: for instance, the two systems at the 
heart of the crisis -  the United States and the United Kingdom – 
exhibited  different regulatory cultures,  different historical trajectories, 
and  different political settings.  The British system was indeed marked 
by a historically engrained regulatory culture which marginalized the role 
of law and stressed the priority of  regulation practised in a cooperative 
fashion with market actors.  Some of the more catastrophic failings in the 
supervision of Northern Rock can indeed be traced to this style of ‘light 
touch’ regulation (Treasury Committee 2008).  Some of the most 
influential post-mortems on the British case, notably the Turner Review,  
draw the lesson that a transformation is needed to a more intrusive, 
adversarial culture (Turner 2009: 88-9; Turner 2010.)  But the historical 
evidence actually suggests that the British style had proved  quite robust: 
the failure of Northern Rock in 2007 was, after all, the first public run by 
depositors on a bank since Overend Gurney in 1866.  It is true that the 
British system also gave us the fiasco of the Barings collapse in the mid 
1990s, and that this fiasco was in part traceable to an earlier instance of 
light touch regulation where supervisors placed excessive trust in the 
regulated (Moran 2001.)  But it is also true that the more aggressive, 
legally based and adversarial system in the US had in the fairly recent 
past given us the savings and loan fiasco, and the Enron and Worldcom 
swindles.  The British system certainly privileged market institutions and 
actors, and helped marginalize the institutions of democratic 
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accountability; but the historical experience hardly points to its unique 
vulnerability to the kind of systemic meltdown experienced in 2007-8.    
 
Moreover, even if we could trace the origins of the British failure to 
informality, market friendliness and light touch regulation we would still 
face the problem of explaining the much more significant American 
failure – more significant because it was the American meltdown that 
precipitated the crisis of October-November 2008, and because it was in 
the United States that the sheer scale of collapse was greatest.  For the 
United States had a very different set of regulatory arrangements, and 
moreover arrangements which seemed to guard against the potential 
deficiencies of the British system: it possessed a system with a well 
established history of adversarial regulation of business; long established 
and technically proficient regulatory bodies; and a tradition of powerful 
democratic oversight both of the regulatory process and of the markets.  
Moreover, these arrangements had been laid down after the crisis of the 
Great Depression, and had proved robust, at least in averting systemic 
collapse, for nigh on seventy years.   
 
The critical question, therefore, is: why did this robustness decline so 
drastically?  In part there are clues in the regulatory history of the decades  
before the great crash when multiple conditions encouraged complacency 
about regulatory dangers,  After the Great Depression there was a long 
period of prudential stability in financial markets.  This prudential 
stability decayed from about the middle of the 1970s, with the onset of 
the era of financial deregulation.  Notable instances in the Anglo-
American systems included the secondary banking crisis in the UK in the 
1970s;  the savings and loan crisis in the US in the 1980s; the collapse of 
the House of Barings which led to the reconfiguration of the UK 
regulatory system in the late 1990s;  and the dot com bubble right at the 
end the millennium.  These failures might have been expected to alert 
regulators to the growing fragility of the prudential foundations of 
financial institutions.  The market practices which led directly to the 
systemic crisis have now been pretty well documented and should have 
caused alarm. Complex derivative instruments, that were supposed to 
manage and minimise risk, became embedded in volume driven banking 
business models with the rise of proprietary trading.  (That is, the system 
where financial services firms no longer act as intermediaries but trade 
directly for profit in the markets: they become players in the casino.)    
This produced  a fragile lattice work of interdependence and counterparty 
obligations which was highly vulnerable to changing market values or 
behaviours (Erturk and Solari 2007; Engelen 2010). After the crash, 
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unfolding revelations about accounting and trading practices at giants like 
Lehman and Goldman Sachs show that these markets were built on 
conflicts of interest  and tolerated a culture of opportunism that blurred 
the line between sharp practice and criminality (Dorn 2010; Valukas 
2010.) 
The development of this fragile system, and of blindness to its regulatory 
dangers, depended on multiple conditions of ideologies, interests and 
institutions; the effect was that in the  whole period after the 1970s  the 
power and authority of regulators was increasingly diminished.  At the 
intellectual root of this blindness lay the rise within the economics 
profession of theories of efficient markets – of theories that ascribed to 
market processes and institutions a superior capacity (superior to 
regulators) to monitor, measure and anticipate risk.  We do not need to 
explore too closely what the origins of these theories were, but they  
conquered large parts of the profession   and were central to the account 
of the workings of finance which was taught in the leading business 
schools (see Ormerod 2010; and Buiter 2009.) Equally significant,  
the connections between academic economics, market practices and 
regulatory styles in the period leading up the crisis has a more concretely 
structural form.  In the generation before the great crash financial 
economics – especially through the processes of business school 
education and in the role of professional economists in consultancies and 
in research departments of financial institutions – became an important 
component of corporate life.  This corporatisation of a discipline which 
had hitherto been organised in relatively autonomous academic 
hierarchies, was important in reinventing the media visible and publicly 
engaged economist. He (it is still usually a he) is no longer a professor 
against the background of a book case  but the “ chief economist” of a 
giant investment bank against the background of a dealing room. 
 
The account of how markets (supposedly) managed risk in an efficient 
manner was closely allied to the institutional reconfiguration of market 
regulation which occurred in this period.  Institutionally the period is 
marked by contradictory tendencies.  On the one hand, it was, especially 
in the United Kingdom, a period of significant institutional innovation 
designed to strengthen public supervisory arrangements: the original 
deregulation of markets in the 1980s was accompanied by the creation of 
a public regulatory regime around a Securities and Investments Board, 
which was charged with responsibility to supervise an array of Self 
Regulatory Organizations that covered the major markets.  In that 
reconfiguration in the mid 1980s the Bank of England was still powerful 
and prestigious enough to retain control over banking supervision (Moran 
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1991 summarises.)  The Barings collapse, coupled with the return of New 
Labour in 1997, led to three critical developments:  the Bank was stripped 
of its lead responsibility for banking supervision; a newly created 
Financial Services Authority was endowed with comprehensive 
responsibility for regulation of the financial system; and a Standing 
Committee chaired by the Treasury  was created to coordinate the roles of 
the three key institutional actors, the FSA, the Bank of England and the 
Treasury (HM Treasury 2006 gives pre-crisis arrangements.)  This looked 
like a considerable increase in public control over the markets: for 
instance, the reforms centralised on the FSA responsibilities which in the 
US system were divided between several agencies at the Federal level 
and numerous agencies at the level of individual states.   
 
But we now know that at the same time as these institutional innovations 
were happening, the new theories of market efficiency were also 
encouraging a considerable ‘naturalisation’ of markets – that, after all, 
was the critical feature of the intellectual superstructure erected by the 
corporatised disciplines of financial economics, accounting and financial 
law.  This was a period when democratic governments became 
increasingly attached to doctrines of signalling credible commitments 
about sound money policies to financial markets, the most important sign 
of which was the spread of arrangements for independent setting of short 
term interest rates by technocratically governed central banks (described 
in Roberts 2010: especially 23-46.)   In both the United States and the 
United Kingdom the emphasis on naturalising markets had impacts on  
the resources and the style of regulatory institutions.  The SIB in the UK, 
despite being a very tentative step in the direction of public regulation, 
was subject to constant attacks for its interventionism; the Barings fiasco 
showed that despite the history of bank failures from the 1970s the Bank 
of England practised, for elite institutions, a high trust, non-
interventionist style; and the history of the FSA in the first ten years of its 
life was one of accommodation to the markets, and of self-consciously 
light touch regulation.  In the United States, from the Reagan era there 
was persistent pressure on regulatory agencies to soften adversarialism, 
and a constant pressure on their resources – something that was a key, for 
instance, to the failure to pick up high risk fraudsters like Madoff.  At the 
root of this was a conviction that the very innovativeness of markets was 
itself a powerful protection against prudential failure: that the complexity 
of the instruments devised and traded in markets were themselves 
powerful mechanisms of systemic risk management.  As Alan Greenspan 
put it, as late as 2005: 
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Conceptual advances in pricing options and other complex 
financial products, along with improvements in computer and 
telecommunications technologies, have significantly lowered the 
costs of, and expanded the opportunities for, hedging 
risks….increasingly complex financial instruments have 
contributed to the development of a far more flexible, efficient, and 
hence resilient financial system than the one that existed just a 
quarter-century ago (Greenspan 2005.)  
But there were also more brutal forces at work.  If historically engrained 
ideologies of market friendly regulation shaped British behaviour, sheer 
lobbying muscle defanged American adversarialism.  In particular, the 
defenders of deregulated markets were able to use their financial muscle 
to produce compliant behaviour from members of Congress hungry for 
campaign funds.  For instance, well before the crash the Bush 
Administration was worried about the market practices of the two giant 
mortgage corporations -  Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac -  that eventually 
had to be taken into public ownership in the crisis.  But its efforts to 
impose regulation were successfully obstructed by the two institutions, 
who used their lobbying muscle to mobilise congressional allies 
(ironically, typically Democratic party allies) to block the 
Administration’s proposals (Thompson 2009.)  
 
Crude lobbying was made more effective in turn because of the wider 
empowerment of key interests in markets. Intellectual developments 
(naturalisation) and institutional developments (credible commitment 
arrangements) are inseparable from some of the wider structural features 
of financial markets in this period: the rise to dominance of the doctrine 
of shareholder value, which legitimised the supremacy of one group – 
holders of property rights –  in decisions over the fate of enterprises; the 
rise of trading in those property rights as a source of profit; and the rise of 
a plutocratic elite which extracted historically unprecedented rewards 
from proprietary trading and from managing  processes of financial 
intermediation in activities like private equity. (Froud et al 2006; Erturk 
and Solari 2007; Engelen et al 2010.). Under the so called “ comp ratio “ 
system, senior investment bankers had established a kind of joint venture 
arrangement with shareholders which entitled them to a half share of 
turnover which they could increase at will. More so than in any other 
period since the US Robber Barons , the UK and US investment bankers 
who profited  from financial innovation were standing next to a huge, 
open till and, predictably, wanted everybody else to get out of their way 
as they shovelled the money.    
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Making sense of the roots of regulatory failure in the great banking crisis 
bears directly on our understanding of ‘the post crisis governing agenda.’  
The crisis was not (contrary to the claims of those like Turner 2009: 39)  
an intellectual failure; nor can it be assimilated to the kind of fatalism 
about human nature which lies behind those accounts that picture it as  
the latest in a long line of instances of human credulity  (Reinhart and 
Rogoff 2009.)  It had its origins in a combination of theoretical 
understandings, institutional arrangements and economic interests which 
are often carried over into the world of crisis management and post-crisis 
reconstruction. But the emphasis on continuity and the general analysis of 
frame conditions is incomplete because the favourable environment for 
banking and finance had to be established and maintained in each new 
conjncture. And there is then an interesting and important question about 
how things were allowed to get completely out of hand in the upswing of 
the 2000s which followed the tech stock crash in spring 2000. 
 
When opening the new London School of Economics building, Queen 
Elizabeth asked the social scientists why nobody saw it coming?  Her 
assumption was incorrect. Theoretically,  the new literature on 
financialization in the 2000s had identified the probability that a more 
financialized capitalism would be troubled by asset price bubbles and 
wealth effects rather than commodity price inflation and trade union pay 
demands (eg Boyer 2000). Practically, Bezzemer (2009) has 
demonstrated in a scholarly way that a dissident minority of academics, 
from behavioural finance as well as Keynesian and Minskian macro 
economic schools, did see it coming. More precisely, the dissidents had 
focused on the rise of house prices (especially in the USA), correctly 
identified this as an asset price bubble and predicted this would end in 
financial market panic and economic recession. None of them, of course, 
predicted the gravity of the present ongoing crisis because the shadow 
banking system could not be analysed from the publicly available 
accounts of the leading investment banks, which disclosed only an 
alarming ballooning of assets and liabilities. But the publicly available 
evidence was alarming enough to justify major macro policy correction 
and some kind of investigation into the black box of investment banking 
which was producing such remarkable increases in profits. 
 
How and why were the macro economic Cassandras ignored? 
Understanding was powerless because  regulators, academics, bankers 
and politicians all bought into two overlapping stories about the end of 
boom and bust and the benefits of financial innovation. Right up to the 
summer of 2007, the endless repetition of these shared stories by all 
authority figures everywhere deflected attention from the bubble process 
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as it announced real and imagined beneficent outcomes. Thus, the 
Western economies had supposedly made a secular transition to what in 
2002 the Harvard economist Stock called “ the Great Moderation” of non 
inflationary growth without boom or bust. Hence, J-P Cotis (then chief 
economist of the OECD) could write just before the crisis in the 2007 
OECD Economic Outlook  
 
the current economic situation is in many ways better than what we 
have experienced in years. Against that background, we have stuck 
to the rebalancing scenario. Our central forecast remains indeed 
quite benign: a soft landing in the United States, a strong and 
sustained recovery in Europe, a solid trajectory in Japan and 
buoyant activity in China and India. In line with recent trends, 
sustained growth in OECD economies would be underpinned by 
strong job creation and falling unemployment. (Cotis 2007, p. 7) 
 
The moderation reading of macro economic performance and prospects 
intersected with another story about finance which listed the many 
benefits of financial innovation. This reinforced the bias in favour of 
unrestrained finance which was always inherent in the newly coined  term 
“financial innovation” because  innovation in economics is so strongly 
associated with general increases in welfare  Here is Ben Bernanke ( then 
and now chair of the Federal Reserve) speaking in May 2007: 
 
 In addressing the challenges and risks that 
financial innovation may create, we should also 
always keep in view the enormous economic 
benefits that flow from a healthy and innovative 
financial sector. The increasing sophistication and 
depth of financial markets promote economic 
growth by allocating capital where it is most 
productive. And the dispersion of risk more 
broadly across the financial system has, thus far, 
increased the resilience of the system and the 
economy to shocks. (Bernanke 2007.)   
 
These stories had anecdotal support but were never well evidenced 
empirically when economists like Costin ignored the anomalous evidence 
of bubble and Bernanke did not engage with what derivatives did. Nor,  
conversely were these stories primarily matters of belief even though a 
banker economist like Bernanke was making a large leap of faith. The  
stories are best understood as liturgies or familiar, often repeated forms of 
words which reassure the congregation by creating a narrative world 
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where all manner of things shall be well. The agenda of governance right 
up to the crisis was marginalisation of the public regulator through 
inactivity and acquiescence underwritten by general  complacency. . Just 
weeks before the crisis started, the Financial Services Authority  in the 
UK was concerned that regulatory reforms should inter alia ensure, in the 
words of the its chief executive,  that ‘the UK continues to be Europe’s 
recognised centre of financial innovation’ (Finncial Services Authority: 
2007) 
 
 
(2) Managing financial crisis ( which upsets the governing 
agenda)   
 
Crises, famously, are turning points: a critical moment occurs when the 
patient is irrevocably transformed, for better or worse. The medical 
analogy also raises interesting questions about the limits of knowledge 
and practice: in many crises the expert either does not know what will 
work reliably or maybe even what to do next.  If the ongoing crisis since 
2007 has a transformative quality, the eventual character of the 
transformation is not yet clear, as we show in the next section.  What we 
can say, however, is that in a short space of time the governing agenda 
was completely upset. Inactivity in financial regulation was no longer 
sustainable and intervention had to be improvised as events challenged 
established understandings and expectations. The crisis, and its 
management, had five key effects which are examined here in turn.   
 
1. The politics of financial market regulation on both sides of the Atlantic 
was reconfigured.   
For about three decades before the crisis,  the notion that financial 
markets should be kept free from political control  dominated the minds 
of market actors and policy makers.  That was the reasoning behind light 
touch regulation, the naturalisation of market processes that pictured risk 
management as the domain of market innovation, and the removal of 
politicians’ control over short term interest rates in favour of committees 
dominated by econocrats.  (Econocrats are a sub-species of technocrat  
produced by the economics profession which has come to dominate, in 
particular, central banking in the last couple of decades.)  The events of 
2007-8 are a moment when a thirty year long experiment to insulate 
financial markets from democratic control came to an end.  The narratives 
of the crisis of autumn 2008 are narratives about the assertion of control 
by some democratic actors, such as the rejection of the first version of the 
Troubled Assets Recovery Program by the US House of Representatives 
(insider accounts are in Swaigel 2009 and Paulson 2010.)  More 
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generally, they are a narrative of events in which the details of banking 
had been turned into the material of high politics on both sides of the 
Atlantic, involving the most prominent of democratic actors – such as the 
Prime Minister and the Chancellor in the United Kingdom.   
 
Debates about regulation shifted arenas: they were no longer confined to 
the domain of low politics, populated by technocrats, but were the subject 
of investigation by elected politicians, and the stuff of front pages rather 
than financial pages.  Perhaps the culmination of this transformation was 
the series of ‘show trials’ of prominent bankers by committees of the 
legislature on both sides of the Atlantic in 2008-9: occasions when 
legislators used commission hearings publicly to  skewer bankers unused 
to the cut and thrust of  hearings before committees of the legislature.  
After a House of Commons Treasury Committee hearing.  Sir Fred 
Goodwin and some other former leading bankers appeared on the front 
page of the tabloid The Sun under the heading ‘Scumbag Millionaires’: 
they were thus pitched into arenas from which the politics of banking had 
been designed to protect them for the previous three decades.  The 
shifting of arenas looks superficially a comparatively unimportant 
procedural change.  It was nevertheless fundamental precisely because it 
involved an implicit rejection of an assumption that had dominated the 
government of financial regulation for several decades: that it belonged 
appropriately to a domain of low politics dominated by market actors and 
econocrats. 
 
2. Adversarial regulation was strengthened 
 
Adversarial regulation – the notion that the regulator should not trust the 
regulated and should use the weight of the law against them – is a well 
embedded tradition in American regulatory culture, especially in 
American business regulation (Kagan 2001.)    It derives from a mix of a 
populist legacy and a pervasive culture of adversarial legalism.   It is  
perhaps the best established, and most distinctive feature, of the culture of 
regulating American business, viewed comparatively, and it has certainly 
been a striking point of contrast between financial regulation in the 
United Kingdom and the United States. But adversarialism  had been at 
its weakest in the regulation of financial markets.  The system created in 
the 1930s around the SEC, for instance, relied heavily on ‘franchising’ 
the business of daily regulation to private bodies, like stock exchanges 
and to professional bodies in accounting; and, since the appointment of  
the notorious speculator Joseph Kennedy as the first chairman of the 
SEC, the Commission had been close to the markets.  The era of 
deregulation, in addition, was not kind to the adversarial tradition in 
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financial markets. Although crises like Enron and Worldcom led to some 
reconfiguration of accounting and auditing regulation,  the regulatory 
agencies were under severe resource pressure, the intellectual climate 
favoured light touch cooperative regulation, and attempts to extend 
regulation over practices and institutions  that subsequently proved 
troublesome were successfully rebuffed by the lobbying muscle of the 
financial services industry (see the history of the Bush Administration’s 
attempts to regulate Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, above.)   
 
But we also know that all this took place in a culture where there still 
existed a general, background murmur of hostility to Wall Street and to 
big business, and where the drift of public opinion over the preceding 
three decades had been hostile to big business, in particular to big 
business represented by Wall Street (evidence summarised in  Moran 
2009). This background hostility meant that it was not difficult to set off 
the wave of American popular hostility against Wall Street in the autumn 
of 2008.  Secretary Paulson’s first plan publicly to underwrite the banking 
system’s untradeable debts reawakened that hostility.  By 2010 both 
Congress and the SEC were on the job, pursuing in particular Goldman 
Sachs on fraud charges (SEC 2010.)   The ‘show trial’ of senior Goldman 
Sachs executives by the Senate Permanent Subcommittee on 
Investigations, harrowing though it may have been for the executives, 
was only a sampler: the subcommittee was merely using Goldman Sachs 
as a case study in its longer running investigation of Wall Street (Senate 
Permanent Investigations Subcomittee 2010.)   The SEC had also been 
reinvigorated under new leadership and was presenting itself to Congress 
in a much tougher language of adversarialism (see Chair Schapiro’s 
testimony, Schapiro 2010.) 
 
In the UK, after almost a generation when leading politicians of all main 
parties had celebrated the City of London as an emblem of British 
economic success that should be left to get on with its own affairs, both 
government and opposition now pledged to tighten legal controls.   More 
important still, technocrats like Lord Turner, the new chair of the 
Financial Services Authority, and econocrats like the Governor of the 
Bank of England, and his executive director for financial stability, began 
to use explicitly adversarial language in their account both of what had 
gone wrong in the past, and what needed to be put right in the future 
(King 2009; Haldane 2009a).  Turner’s review for the FSA, and his 
subsequent intervention dismissing much financial innovation as ‘socially 
useless’, was an attempt to create a conscious turning point in the 
regulatory culture: it disavowed the ‘light touch’ approach that had 
shaped the Authority’s behaviour from its foundation; used dismissive 
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language about the supposed benefits of much innovation in markets; and 
embraced a more adversarial and ‘intrusive’ regulatory style (Turner 
2009 and 2010.).  That attempt to stake out a distinctive position in the 
regulatory landscape was in part a manoeuvre in something we describe 
below: the turf struggles between regulatory agencies set off by the crisis 
and its aftermath.  But it is significant that in these struggles to defend 
agency turf (and in the case of the FSA  the very existence of the 
Authority) it was felt necessary to resort to the language of adversarialism 
in a system that had hitherto made a virtue of cooperative regulation.  The 
new spirit of adversarialism also spilled over into the challenging public 
confrontations between legislators, regulators and, most important, 
executives from failed institutions, as politicians began to sense the 
electoral mileage to be gained from confronting the leaders of the 
financial services industry. 
 
3. Large parts of the financial system were taken into public ownership.  
 
The age of deregulation was also an age of privatisation, in which 
politicians, especially in the United Kingdom, competed with each other 
to privatise key industries.  The Conservative hegemony in the 1980s had 
turned the UK into world champions in the scale of privatisation.  For 
New Labour, the commitment in the ill fated 1983 general election 
manifesto to take parts of the banking system into public ownership stood 
as a symbol of the perceived electorally suicidal and economically 
anachronistic practices of ‘old’ Labour.   Unsurprisingly, therefore, New 
Labour in 2007 was at first driven only slowly and reluctantly in the 
direction of accepting any new forms of public ownership.  The first great 
event of the crisis occurred in September 2007 when the Treasury was 
obliged to replace the limited guarantees for depositors by a state 
guarantee that, soon, amounted to an assurance that public money would 
guarantee all deposits in the  failing bank, Northern Rock.  But the  initial 
response of policy makers was to dither and resist public ownership: in 
the months immediately after the collapse of Northern Rock, millions 
were spent on consultants in a failed attempt to off load the stricken bank.   
 
The scale of the systemic collapse in October-November 2008 
concentrated minds wonderfully.  The authorities were obliged to 
establish United Kingdom Financial Investments (UKFI) as a vehicle for 
managing public ownership of a huge tranche of the banking system. By 
July 2009 UKFI owned 70% of the voting share capital of Royal Bank of 
Scotland, and 43% of the Lloyds Banking Group. Or as John Kingman, 
UKFI Chief Executive put it in more homely terms in introducing UKFI’s 
first Annual Report:  ‘Every UK household will have more than £3,000 
 16 
invested in shares in RBS and Lloyds.’  (United Kingdom Financial 
Investments 2009: 2.)  In the United States, apart from the ‘nationalising’ 
of a huge volume of bank debt, two leading suppliers of housing 
mortgages were also taken into public ownership: the Federal National 
Mortgage Association,; and the Federal Home Mortgage Corporation.  
These events dramatised how the wheel of policy had turned.   Fannie 
Mae was created under President Roosevelt’s New Deal as part of the 
attempt to cope with the last great global financial crash.  It was  
privatised in 1968 near the start of the modern era of free market 
triumphalism, and two years later Freddie Mac was created as a private 
sector competitor.   
 
The huge extension of formal public ownership, combined with the even 
more extensive state underwriting of the banking system in the crisis, is 
the single most important structural consequence of the crisis: it is the key 
to the fiscal crisis of states and the interrelated soveriegn debt crisis 
which together have been so central to post crisis economic management.  
But it is also the key to much of the subsequent politics of the financial 
system, for this dramatic reversal of long established policy raised an 
obvious question: on what terms would the new state presence in the 
financial system be established?  Since the state had socialised banking 
losses, what price, if any, would be exacted in return for socialisation?  
The problem of how to answer that question has shaped the way interests 
and institutions have maneouvred in the post crisis world – the theme of 
the next section of this paper – but it also deeply affected the role of 
politicians in the actual management of the crisis itself. 
 
4. Politicians became managers of the financial system 
 
 The wave of nationalisation was itself the sign of a wider shift: a huge 
increase in the importance of politicians in financial management.  On 
both sides of the Atlantic the ferocity of the crisis sucked governing 
politicians into the detail of managing markets: brokering mergers and 
takeovers to rescue failing institutions; extending the guarantees of 
protection to depositors in retail banks against the threat of collapse, to 
the point where the state was guaranteeing virtually all deposits in the 
system; using treasury and central bank resources to supply the financial 
markets with liquidity to try to keep trading going.   
 
Some of the most important effects were felt in the high politics of the 
European Union.  Before the crisis, financial regulation in the Union had 
been a classic zone of low politics: a domain dominated by dense 
networks inhabited by market actors and econocrats.  After it, competing 
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visions of a reconstructed regulatory order, and ‘grandstanding’ in 
defence of the interests of national markets, became central to the high 
politics of the Union.  A possibly even more profound consequence has 
been  to raise to the highest level of political sensitivity issues hitherto 
buried in the Growth and Stability Pact.  The trigger for this was the 
attempt by Greece to manage the fiscal fallout of the crisis.  The Euro had 
protected weak Eurozone economies like Greece and Ireland from the 
fate succumbed to by Iceland (a catastrophic devaluation of the national 
currency)  but at the price of putting huge strain on the growth and 
stability pact, and pushing to the head of politicians’ agendas in the 
Eurozone the problem of how to manage fiscal imablances in the  
member countries of the Eurozone. The first response in May 2010 was a 
bail out package designed to buy some time in the markets and to take 
market pressure off the Greek Government which was effectively locked 
out of the bond markets and to prevent the contagion spreading via 
Ireland to Portugal and Spain.  The fact that this attempt failed placed 
issues of financial stabilisation right at the heart of high politics in the 
Union, notably in the acrimonious bail out of the Irish state and Irish 
banking system in November 2010. 
 
The European dimension of the crisis was made more salient still by the 
fifth effect identified below. 
 
  
 
 
5. An extended series of turf  wars  began   
 
In the very heat of the crisis in October-November 2008 the participants 
had to act so quickly that they had little time for reflection, still less for 
reflection on the future shape of the regulatory system.  But as policy 
makers have begun to survey the ruins, three interlinked factors, already 
discussed above, came together to convert the process of regulatory 
reconstruction into an extended series of turf struggles between 
regulatory agencies: the attempt to recast a regulatory philosophy to 
replace that discredited by the crash; the rising salience of issues of 
regulatory construction and reform in high politics, especially among 
elected politicians; and the debates about how to shape the post crisis 
financial system. In the case of the United States, even in the middle of 
the crisis, for instance, it was obvious that the stage of institutional reform 
would soon be reached; that this stage would create great opportunities 
and dangers for the agencies; and that the realization of these 
opportunities and dangers would depend critically on cultivating key 
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Congressional allies.  The new Administration’s first attempt at 
substantial regulatory reform -  flagged in the Treasury’s Financial 
Regulatory Reform (2009) – represented a considerable widening of the 
Fed’s jurisdictions.  The process of trying to manage reforms through 
Congress set off a prolonged bout of inter-agency struggles for turf, 
including competitive briefing of journalists and advocacy of competing 
positions in Congressional hearings – processes that even pressure from 
Treasury Secretary Geithner could not shut down (Paletta and Solomon 
2009; Paletta 2009.)  
 
These intra-elite struggles took a more publicly dramatic form in January 
2010 with President Obama’s announcement of proposals presented as an 
attempt to revive the spirit of Glass-Steagall: proposals, notably, to 
prohibit any bank holding deposits under public guarantee from operating 
hedge funds, private equity funds or trading on its own book – 
‘proprietary trading.’   Briefings to journalists suggested that the turn by 
the President to these measures, and to populist rhetoric (‘If these folks 
want a fight it’s a fight I’m ready to have’) was the result of a struggle for 
the President’s ear  in the preceding months between competing sections 
of the technocratic elite offering more or less radical visions of reform: 
the prominence of Paul Volcker at the President’s public announcement, 
and the announcement that the proposed prohibitions would be known as 
the Volcker Rule, confirm this.   
 
The new proposals had a tortuous passage through a Congress with 
legislators  hungry for the campaign finance support of rich finance 
lobbies (for instance Paletta 2010.)   Much of the impact of the reforms 
will lie in the way the regulatory details unfold in implementation.  But 
the process  reinforces the way the process of regulatory reform is now 
entangled with turf battles in the US system.  It also shows that these 
battles spill over between the US and the UK systems: the Obama 
proposals strengthened the hands of those in the British technocratic elite, 
notably in the Bank of England, advocating more radical structural 
reforms. 
 
 
That intellectual struggle in the UK is in turn bound up with turf 
struggles.   The system created in 1997, and now discredited,  amounted 
to a considerable loss of jurisdiction by the Bank of England, principally 
as a punishment for its incompetence in supervising Barings.  The debate 
about the reconstruction of the system allowed the Bank to reopen this 
division of regulatory labour.  The Governor made crystal clear in his 
June 09 Mansion House speech that the Bank  supported a more radical 
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structural reconfiguration of the banking system than was envisaged in, 
for instance, the Treasury.  Moreover, he also made a clear bid for an 
increase in the Bank’s regulatory authority: 
 
To achieve financial stability the powers of the Bank are limited to 
those of voice and the new resolution powers. The Bank finds itself 
in a position rather like that of a church whose congregation 
attends weddings and burials but ignores the sermons in between. 
Like the church, we cannot promise that bad things won’t happen 
to our flock – the prevention of all financial crises is in neither our 
nor anyone else’s power, as a study of history or human nature 
would reveal. And experience suggests that attempts to encourage 
a better life through the power of voice is not enough. Warnings 
are unlikely to be effective when people are being asked to change 
behaviour which seems to them highly profitable. So it is not 
entirely clear how the Bank will be able to discharge its new 
statutory responsibility if we can do no more than issue sermons or 
organise burials (King 09.) 
 
By 2010 this turf war had become enmeshed with adversarial party 
politics.  The adversarial party system in the UK demands that opposing 
teams of party politicians adopt policy that distinguishes them from their 
opponents.  Adversarialism demands that oppositions create a reverse 
image of governing policies, almost regardless of ideological consistency.  
Thus it is that the Bank has found an unlikely ally in the form of the 
Conservatives in opposition who, attempting to  distinguish themselves 
from the Brown Administration,  advocated a recentralisation of 
regulatory jurisdiction in the Bank, and flirted with some of the more 
radical proposals for a reconstruction of the banking system.  Indeed the 
new Chancellor’s first significant statement on banking regulation (in his 
Mansion House speech of June 2009) confirmed that the Financial 
Services Authority would be dismembered and authority centralised in 
the Bank. 
 
It is obvious that the process of crisis management has overlapped with 
the process of  constructing a post crisis regulatory order – an unfinished 
task to the description of which we now turn. 
 
 
(3) Instead of one governing agenda: competing stories and 
“where you stand is where you sit”  
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This section is about the failure (so far) to construct one post crisis 
governing agenda to replace the pre 2007 agenda of governance which 
may have been reassuring but was intellectually discredited and 
practically unsustainable after the crisis. The section has two central 
themes. The first theme is that the conflict over agendas is immediately a 
narrativised struggle between different groups trying to put one over with 
their competing stories. That is not surprising because in politics it is not 
enough just to take decisions: the decisions have to be made coherent and 
significant – and that is the purpose of narrative.  The second theme is 
that, as long as no story wins out, group identity, institutional affiliation 
and crude calculations of interest become more important as the new 
polity is “ turf wars” writ large. Narrativised struggle thus has a 
paradoxical almost pre-cultural outcome because, from 2008 onwards, the 
best predictor of  ‘where you stand’ is ‘where you sit’.  For this reason, 
the analysis in this section is organised by groups so that we consider in 
sequence the varying stories and deformation professionelle of these 
different groups. 
 
The paroxysm  of crisis itself in October-November 2008 was easily 
turned into a congenial, shared story  about elites ‘saving’ the banking 
system, and by extension the wider economy, from the threat of systemic 
collapse.  That story could be ‘spun’ in different ways depending on the 
interests and institutional location of actors. In the media, for example,  
Krugman in the New York Times praised Prime Minister Brown’s  
strategic vision and decisiveness in responding to crisis while Wall Street 
Journal op ed columnists argued that the problems at Fannie and Freddie 
stemmed from state intervention (Krugman 2008.).  But matters soon 
became more complicated. Those outside finance, especially those in 
public sector employment,  have found  that hugely expensive bail outs 
have not saved the economy but reallocated the costs between groups and 
redistributed them forwards in time. More fundamentally, what was to be 
the new story about how the post-crisis world should be constructed?  
This inevitably raised many new questions to which there were few 
agreed answers because the crisis had destroyed benign consensus. How 
do the markets operate, how should they operate, what kinds of bank or 
banking should be encouraged or forbidden, what should the role of 
regulators be under heavier touch regulation, what should be the balance 
between structural reform and new forms of supervision such as macro 
prudential regulation? 
 
The interim result was that the pre crisis ‘groupthink’ went pluralist after 
the crisis in a new period dominated by the attempts of different groups 
of actors to construct a convincing post crisis governing story. The end 
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result is multiple competing narratives and a world of conflict 
increasingly shaped by the institutional position and economic interests of 
different groups of actors.  Space only allows us here to sketch the 
development of the different stories and the diverse calculations of  
politicians, technocrats and  bankers in the UK and USA. Of course, 
individuals can move between groups as regulators can be recruited from 
banking or civil servants can become bankers, as fusion of the 
metropolitan elites is a way of life in London and Washington .  But the 
striking feature of the post crisis period is the way that the calculative 
logic of interests and institutional location has pushed various sets of 
actors in the direction of elaborating different narrative representations of 
their positions and justifications of the (changing) policy stances that they 
have adopted.  
 
Politicians’ stories 
 
The single most important impact of the crisis has been to transform the 
kind of stories that politicians tell about financial markets and their 
regulation.  Before the crisis, only a small minority of iconoclasts and/or 
radicals dissented from the consensus stories emanating from the 
economics profession, the markets and the technocrats in the regulatory 
agencies: to wit, that problems of risk management had been solved by 
innovative markets; that markets were better than public regulators at 
estimating and managing risk; and that a healthy economy demanded 
light touch regulation in the interests of maximising the capacity of 
markets to generate high value added employment.  After the crisis, that 
story could no longer be told – or told so convincingly.  As we have seen, 
there were a number of short term narratives: for instance, in the British 
case involving the picture of the Brown Administration as unique in its 
strategic vision and ability to organise other states into coordinated 
rescue; in the case of the high politics of the EU a variety of competing 
stories representing national leaders as defending the interests of their 
national centres against national rivals or the ‘threat’ of  EU regulation;  
stories about the uniqueness of national systems in the face of regulatory 
initiatives elsewhere (the British response, for example, to the Obama 
Administration’s initiative to restrict proprietary trading by banks 
receiving public support.)   
 
But the most important force shaping the stories that politicians have felt 
compelled to tell is, unsurprisingly, the influence of competitive electoral 
politics.  The shaping force in turn has been different depending on the 
way that competition has been organised in different systems. The results   
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so far in the two countries that are our main focus are different but 
equally unpromising of reform: in the United States, a purposive 
executive is frustrated by the legislature; while, in the United Kingdom, 
New Labour’s absence of executive purpose continues under the 
Conservative Lib Dem coalition.  
 
In the United States, the executive under Obama and Geithner does know 
what it wants to do and by Spring 2010 was pressing a radical package of 
structural reforms because better regulation was not enough. Tim 
Geithner (Washington Post, 13 April 2010) was quite explicit that “ we 
cannot build a system that depends on the wisdom and judgement of 
future regulators” to pre-empt further crisis, Hence the Obama 
administration’s  structural proposal for putting dervatives trading onto 
exchanges and for breaking up big investment banks like Goldman or 
conglomerates like Citi because all banks would be banned from own 
account prop trading, hedge fund or private equity management. But the 
question in the USA was whether this kind of package will be passed by a 
legislature heavily influenced by the need for prominent  politicians to 
build their own independent electoral base and win individual electoral 
struggles. That explains why, at the height of the crisis, the Republican 
candidate, John McCain, made his maladroit effort to muscle into the 
Bush Administration’s crisis management process, which happened to 
coincide with the Presidential contest with Obama.  Political attention to 
the aftermath of the crisis has been heavily influenced also by the 
calculations of important congressional figures, notably the Chair of the 
Senate Banking Committee, a critical figure in the shaping of the post 
crisis regulatory world.  In these manoeuvrings elected politicians in 
Congress have to respond to a number of influences: they can draw on a 
reservoir of popular hostility to bankers, and did so, to shape a story 
about bad, greedy bankers, using the high profile opportunities of 
congressional hearings to arraign selected figures; they can use their 
positions in shaping the post crisis regulation to wield influence with the 
regulatory agencies competing for ‘turf’; and they can, and indeed in the 
interests of electoral survival, must, use their position to extract campaign 
funds from the finance industry.   
 
In the UK, by contrast, the most important consequence of the aftermath 
of the crisis was to transform the issue of banking regulation into a 
subject for the system of adversarial politics.    In the British case, a 
powerful executive can always get its way if it knows what to do, but that 
basic precondition was not satisfied after the crisis in the case of banking 
reform.  Before the crisis, financial regulation had essentially been a 
valence issue: the main parties competed only to represent themselves as 
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the most competent to foster the health of the City.  After it, they 
competed to tell about their ability to punish ‘bad’ bankers, and to impose 
regulatory restrictions on banking institutions.  But these stories were 
shot through with contradictions.  The initial management of the newly 
acquired banks in the rescue was represented in a highly traditional, pre-
crisis language of extracting maximum shareholder value.  In addition, as 
the General Election of May 2010 approached the parties 
opportunistically adopted a variety of positions to try to position 
themselves for maximising electoral advantage:  thus the Conservatives 
tried to outflank Labour on the question of the imposition of (transaction 
taxes) on the banks; while Labour responded with a highly traditional 
narrative representing such measures as damaging to the competitiveness 
of the City -  even though Chancellor Darling had, in populist mood,  
earlier introduced a one off tax on bankers’ bonuses.  Neither major Party 
won a majority in the ensuing election which resulted in a Conservative 
coalition with the Liberal Democrats who were more radical on banking.  
The key issue – what to do about structural reform of the banking system 
– has now been remitted to an investigative commission which has been 
despatched with instructions to take at least a year over its deliberations. 
 
 Technocrats’ stories 
If the politicians’ stories were dominated by the problem of 
incorporating a narrative about responses to the crisis into the 
demands of electoral competition, the technocrats’ tales were 
dominated by the need to produce an intellectually coherent account of 
regulation in a post-crisis world.  On both sides of the Atlantic 
regulation has become a highly technocratic activity; the domination 
of technocrats –  and in particular of econocrats – is symbolised by the 
fact that the two key regulatory heads, of the respective central banks, 
had previous careers as academic economists during which they 
briefly shared an office in MIT.  Indeed, the ‘scientization’ of central 
banking – to use Marcussen’s coinage – was widespread 
internationally. (Marcussen 2006, 2009; and Lomax 2007 on the 
process in Britain under the Monetary Policy Committee regime.)  
This is a world where data, and intellectually defensible theories 
supported by data, provide the key currencies.  How could this 
econocratic elite make sense of the collapse of the intellectual 
structure which had supported the pre-crisis intellectual system?  
Buiter puts their problem with characteristic bluntness: ‘ The Bank of 
England in 2007 faced the onset of the credit crunch with too much 
Robert Lucas, Michael Woodford and Robert Merton in its intellectual 
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cupboard.  A drastic but chaotic re-education took place and is 
continuing.’ (Buiter 2009).  
For some academic economists the response was to argue that the failures 
had nothing to do with intellectual flaws in the original theories, but 
represented a misuse and misunderstanding of the intellectual framework 
which theories of efficient markets had provided before the crash 
(Minford 2010).  However that may be, this alibi has not carried the day 
among the econocrats in the regulatory agencies.  Indeed, it has become 
clear that on both sides of the Atlantic there is now a consensus among 
key technocrats about the need to back tougher regulatory restrictions 
with structural reform of the banking sector.  
 
Elite British technocrats have led the way in publicly rubbishing the pre 
2007 liturgy about the benefits of  financial innovation. Lord Turner  of 
the Financial Services Authority criticised complex instruments ‘whose 
maximum possible benefits in terms of allocative efficiency was at best 
marginal and  which in their complexity and opacity created large 
financial stability risks’ (Turner 2010.)  The executive director 
responsible for financial stability at the Bank of England, Andrew 
Haldane, has publicly questioned whether the UK financial sector is not 
too large, disputed the  scale advantages of big banks and, when some 
bankers threatened to move abroad in response to the Labour 
Government’s tax on bonuses,  observed that a smaller financial sector 
might be a price worth paying for financial stability (Farrer 2009). The 
Governor of the Bank of England has raised similar questions about 
whether the financial sector is too large and whether big banking 
conglomerates should be broken up. In the US, the econocrats have 
moved to making concrete proposals for structural reform.  In the case of 
the United States, after furious inter-agency fighting, and after struggles 
between the Presidents’ advisors, the Obama and Geithner structural 
reforms use the name and person of Paul Volcker (most respected of 
technocrats) to resurrect the spirit of Glass-Steagall even if they do not 
reinstate the letter of the Glass-Steagall division between retail and casino 
banks, The attempt is radical even if the proposal’s survival prospects are 
poor in the face of the lobbying power of the finance industry.    
 
If the imperatives of electoral competition have driven the kinds of stories 
told by democratically elected politicians, two rather different 
imperatives have shaped the behaviour of econocrats.  First, they do 
indeed inhabit an econocratic world: that is, it is a world where 
intellectually credible and consistent accounts are needed to guide 
institutional construction and regulatory style.  And that in turn has 
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guided the search for a new set of intellectual guidelines, with the more  
radical econocrats arguing for paradigm shift typically towards 
behavioural finance or, as in Haldane’s case, towards a more ecological 
and epidemiological mapping of the financial system.  A second, very 
different imperative is the competition, to which we have already alluded,  
for control of regulatory turf or the property rights that matter to 
regulators   The struggle in the US over the reconstruction of the 
regulatory system in the latter part of 2009 was not just one about the 
intellectual foundations of the regulatory system; it was also a struggle by 
the Fed to emerge as the dominant institution in the new regulatory world 
– a struggle which, for the moment at least, it appears to have won.  
Likewise, the strategy of the Bank of England is about more than 
controlling the banks; it is about recovering some of the regulatory 
authority which it lost in the reforms 1997.   
 
Bankers’ stories  
 
Bankers had a well established narrative before the crisis, and it was one 
which captured the minds of most of those connected both with 
regulation and with economic policy.  As we have seen, it drew its 
legitimacy from efficient market theory and  from theories about the 
importance of the financial services industry in a post industrial economy.  
Obviously the great crisis created problems for these stories, but in the 
crisis itself, and in the post crisis period, the resilience of the bankers’ 
tales  is nevertheless striking.  During  the crisis  bankers benefited 
immensely from a kind of pre story built on apocalyptic forebodings:  it is 
striking how widespread is the consensus that, however badly the banks 
had behaved, they needed to be rescued in order to prevent a wider 
meltdown of the market system.  The one big failure which was allowed 
to happen – of Lehman – was soon integrated into the narrative as a 
policy error which should not be repeated.  By its story about the 
systemic consequences of allowing institutional failure the banking 
industry on both sides of the Atlantic was able to socialise most of the 
astounding losses which had been racked up as a result of the pre-2007 
trading practices.   
 
It is also striking how rapidly the industry moved to re-state its narrative 
about the social and economic utility of innovative financial markets. 
Both the Wigley  Report (December 2008) and the Bischoff Report 
(2009) are marked by magnificent chutzpah: they manage to tell hair of 
the dog stories about the success of London and the British financial 
services industries almost as if the great crisis had never occurred.  Both 
offered detailed – and it turned out on closer inspection highly dubious -  
 26 
pictures of the employment creating and tax revenue generating 
capacities of the financial services industry (for a critique see CRESC 
2009.)  More striking still, Bischoff in particular preserved the narrative 
about the link between social benefits and financial innovation, offering 
the prospect of a whole series of new policy problems  –  such as the 
finance of care in old age -  being addressed by the development of new 
financial instruments.  Bischoff and Wigley were not ‘freelance’ 
operations by the markets.  Both had official status: Wigley was 
commissioned by the Mayor London;  the  Bishchoff report,  though 
almost entirely controlled by the markets,  was published by the Treasury 
and had the Chancellor as a co-signatory.   
 
The bankers’ tale about the need to socialise losses in the interests of 
systemic survival has proved resilient.  Moreover, the terms under which 
the rescued institutions are to be managed and disposed of, at least 
initially, stuck to a pre crisis script: principally, a script about the 
importance of preserving incentives for top executives, maximising 
shareholder (taxpayer) value, and protecting the management of the 
rescued institutions from what is constructed as ‘politics’ – that is, the 
influence of the democratic state (documented in Froud et al 2010.)   But 
the wider narrative about the virtues of financial innovation and the social 
value of finance has proved more difficult to sustain, for three reasons.    
First, it has proved impossible to stem, in the post crisis world, a series of 
scandals about the behaviour of market actors at the height of the boom, 
and the revelations in these scandals have been hard to reconcile with 
sober narratives about the social value of finance: consider the cases of 
Lehman and Goldman discussed above.  Second, the drip of scandalous 
revelation  has interacted with the way banking regulation has been 
dragged into the arena of democratic politics, for it is precisely those 
individual scandals which are easiest for democratic politicians to pursue 
and package in the name of reform.  Third, clear tensions have developed 
between the ambitions of the most important regulatory agencies, and the 
mind world of those agencies, and the interests of the markets.Econocrats 
have their own intellectual priorities, and their own institutional interests 
to defend; they are far from being the instruments of powerful corporate 
interests.  
 
Agenda? What agenda?  
 
Our argument will seem challenging to some readers because it brings 
together two discourses and paradigms which are usually kept separate.  
It brings together a social constructionist commentary on a narrative 
driven world and a more conventional political science about interests 
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and institutions where discourses figure much less prominently. There 
will always be tensions between these two perspectives which cannot be 
reconciled and made coherent within one frame. But then, as this article 
demonstrates,  coherence around a single story is a dangerous thing and 
the  juxtaposition of two paradigms produces an interestingly different 
analysis. Single paradigm analysis is fated to find a world which is 
always the same: that is, always discursively preconstructed or always 
institutionally divided; dual paradigm analysis brings out the difference 
between the world before 2007 and after 2008. The pre crisis world was 
held together by a stable frame and immediate cross group acceptance of 
the liturgy about financial innovation; the post 2008 world is divided by 
group stories and sectional interest with the main actors still in the 
process of trying to create settled stories in the wake of the ruins left by 
the great crisis.  But in all this the old meaning of agenda – repetitive 
liturgical incantation – turns out to be continually important. 
 
Note: Earlier versions of this paper were given to the two preparatory 
workshops organised for this special issue.  We are grateful for the 
comments received, and for the comments of two anonymous referees. 
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